Texas's highest court has spoken: tornadoes count as windstorms for insurance purposes, and windstorm deductibles apply to tornado damage.
When a tornado tore through Jeff and Staci Mankoff's Texas home in 2019, followed by what likely was about two minutes of rain, their insurer had a straightforward position: tornado damage falls under the windstorm deductible. The homeowners disagreed, setting off a legal battle that just reached its conclusion at the state's highest court.
On February 13, the Supreme Court of Texas sided with Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange, ruling that tornadoes unambiguously qualify as windstorms for insurance purposes. The decision reverses an appellate court ruling and settles a question that has practical implications for how insurers across the state handle similar claims.
At stake was an $87,156 windstorm deductible. The insurer paid only a portion of the claim, explaining that the tornado qualified as a windstorm under the policy. The Mankoffs sued for breach of contract, arguing the damage wasn't caused by a windstorm at all.
Here's where it got interesting: the policy never actually defined what windstorm means.
The policy stated that in the event of direct physical loss to covered property caused directly or indirectly by windstorm or hail, the windstorm or hail deductible listed on the declarations would be the amount of covered loss that the policyholder would pay. Simple enough, except the term windstorm itself remained undefined.
The case hinged entirely on how to interpret that single word. The Mankoffs argued that windstorm refers to something distinct from a tornado. Their insurer countered that windstorm is broad enough to include tornadoes.
A trial court agreed with the insurer and granted summary judgment. But a divided Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the term was ambiguous because it could reasonably mean a storm with damaging winds that may or may not be accompanied by precipitation but does not include a tornado.
The appellate court found the insureds' arguments persuasive, pointing to dictionary definitions, media coverage, and statutory provisions that seemed to treat windstorms and tornadoes as separate events.
One appellate judge dissented, arguing that a tornado is obviously a windstorm subtype. The dissent noted that dictionary definitions consistently describe windstorms as storms with violent winds, and tornadoes are marked by violent winds. According to the dissent, it is not reasonable to deny that a tornado is a kind of windstorm.
The Supreme Court agreed with that dissent.
Justice Debra H. Lehrmann, writing for the court, walked through how judges interpret undefined policy terms. When a policy doesn't define a word, courts look to its plain, ordinary meaning using dictionary definitions, then consider how the term appears in statutes and case decisions.
The court found remarkable consistency across dictionaries. Merriam-Webster defines windstorm as a storm marked by high wind with little or no precipitation. The American Heritage Dictionary describes it as a storm with high winds or violent gusts but little or no rain. Webster's New World and Collins English dictionaries offered similar definitions.
The common thread, the court noted, is a storm with violent, strong winds but little or no precipitation.
As for tornadoes, dictionaries consistently describe them as violent, destructive movements of wind. Some dictionaries, including Collins, explicitly call a tornado a type of windstorm, describing it as a localized, violently destructive windstorm occurring over land.
The Mankoffs had focused on that precipitation element, arguing it served as a limiting function. In their briefing, they maintained that because the specific tornado that damaged their home was followed by two minutes of rain, the tornado did not qualify as a windstorm. At oral argument, their position shifted. Their counsel argued instead that a tornado is a categorically different kind of storm that cannot meet the little or no precipitation element of a windstorm because the storm that creates the tornado has heavy precipitation.
The court rejected this reasoning. The classification of the accompanying weather event in which a tornado forms has no bearing on whether the tornado itself is a windstorm, Justice Lehrmann wrote.
She explained that a tornado is just one element that may or may not be part of a larger weather event. A tornado is a windstorm in and of itself, regardless of whether it is a subset of a broader storm involving precipitation.
Put another way: a weather event with lots of rain might not qualify as a windstorm, but that doesn't change the fact that a tornado always qualifies as one.
The Mankoffs pointed to Texas statutes that list tornadoes and windstorms separately, suggesting the legislature treats them as distinct. The court dismissed this argument, noting that broader terms often appear alongside narrower, more specific terms for emphasis. The court recognized that the legislature may repeat itself, and nothing in those provisions suggested windstorm categorically excludes tornadoes. The court found no narrowing modifier in any of the provisions to indicate the legislature understood windstorm to exclude a tornado.
The court also looked at case law, including a 1946 Court of Appeals decision in Fireman's Insurance Co. v. Weatherman. In that case, the trial court submitted a definition of windstorm to the jury as something more than an ordinary gust of wind, no matter how prolonged. Though the whirling features which usually accompany tornadoes and cyclones need not be present, the definition stated it must assume the aspect of a storm.
By defining windstorm in the jury charge as more than an ordinary gust of wind that may or may not have the whirling features of a cyclone or tornado, the Weatherman court necessarily concluded that a tornado qualifies as a windstorm. Several courts since then, including the Fifth Circuit in Landmark American Insurance Co. v. SCD Memorial Place, have favorably cited Weatherman's definition.
The insureds brought in additional support: media coverage of weather events, Encyclopedia Britannica, and even an expert meteorologist who testified about technical distinctions between windstorms and tornadoes.
The court gave these sources little weight. The meteorologist's expert opinion on technical classifications didn't matter much, the court said, since the parties never agreed the policy term should have a specialized meteorological meaning.
The insureds also argued that a windstorm references a weather event with straight-line winds, also known as a derecho, which is distinct from the rotating winds that make up a tornado. The court noted that no definitions of windstorm distinguish between rotating winds and straight-line winds. The court also pointed out that Merriam-Webster defines derecho as a large fast-moving complex of thunderstorms with powerful straight-line winds that cause widespread destruction. Despite a derecho's express association with thunderstorms, which could certainly be considered events with precipitation, the insureds maintained that a derecho is a windstorm while insisting that a tornado is not.
As for the Encyclopedia Britannica entry noting that tornadoes and tropical cyclones are usually classified separately, the court explained that having separate classifications allows people to refer to the more specific term when applicable. The separate classification, however, fails to confer an ordinary meaning of windstorm as a storm with damaging winds that does not include a tornado.
The court emphasized that the fact that a windstorm and a tornado can be distinct events has no bearing on whether a tornado is included within the broader term windstorm. None of the authorities cited by the insureds indicate that a tornado is not a windstorm in and of itself. To the contrary, all authorities indicate that not all windstorms contain tornadoes, but all tornadoes are windstorms, regardless of whether the broader weather event includes precipitation.
The court's bottom line: the common, ordinary meaning of windstorm in an insurance policy unambiguously includes a tornado.
Since the Mankoffs' property damage came from a tornado, and a tornado is a type of windstorm, their claim was subject to the policy's windstorm or hail deductible. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision and put the original trial court judgment back in place.
For insurers, the decision offers helpful clarity on an issue that likely comes up with some regularity in tornado-prone Texas. When policy language doesn't specifically define terms, courts will look to ordinary dictionary meanings. And according to those dictionaries, tornadoes fall squarely within windstorm territory.
The ruling also serves as a reminder about the value of precise policy language. Insurers wanting to treat different wind events differently, or exclude specific perils, will need clear, specific definitions rather than relying on separately listed terms to create distinct categories.
The decision is final.
