Pennsylvania’s Commonwealth Court ordered workers’ comp for a police sergeant’s PTSD after a fatal 2020 encounter, reversing a denial.
On December 8, The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board and remanded with instructions to grant Steve Russo’s Claim and Review Petitions as to disabling mental injuries and to calculate wage loss, statutory interest, and any other amounts due. The ruling directs a Workers’ Compensation Judge to enter an award consistent with the opinion.
Russo’s claim stems from a November 20, 2020 on-duty incident. After a foot chase, he engaged in a violent struggle, was placed in a chokehold, nearly lost control of his service weapon, and fired a single close-range shot. He attempted to render aid; the suspect was later pronounced dead. Russo returned to duty on March 1, 2021 and was removed from work on December 17, 2021 as psychological symptoms intensified.
A Workers’ Compensation Judge denied benefits and refused to amend the injury description to include PTSD and depression; the Board largely affirmed. The Commonwealth Court held the physical/mental standard did not apply because Russo’s immediate physical complaints did not require medical treatment. Applying the mental/mental standard, the court concluded that the overall sequence – hand-to-hand combat, imminent threat to life, risk of losing the firearm, close-range fatal shot, and unsuccessful resuscitation – constituted an abnormal working condition as a matter of law. The court also found the judge improperly rejected uncontroverted, competent PTSD testimony from Russo’s treating psychologist.
The opinion referenced a statutory change effective October 29, 2025 – Section 301(g) of the Workers’ Compensation Act – which removes the abnormal working condition requirement for first responders’ PTSD claims. It does not apply to Russo’s 2022 filing.
Senior Judge Bonnie Brigance Leadbetter concurred, questioning the continued viability of the abnormal‑working‑conditions doctrine for mental injuries. Judge Christine Fizzano Cannon concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing the physical/mental pathway did not apply but concluding the incident did not constitute an abnormal working condition for a police officer under existing precedent.
For municipal risk pools and workers’ comp carriers, the court signaled two practical points. First, factfinders may not divide a traumatic event into routine parts; a court can deem the combined sequence abnormal as a matter of law. Second, consistent, unrebutted psychological evidence linked to a clearly identifiable work event can be decisive, even where immediate physical treatment was minimal. With Section 301(g) set to apply prospectively to first responders, this decision already underscores closer scrutiny of denials premised on characterizing a singular event as routine and on discounting treating‑psychologist opinions.
