A Connecticut court has handed GEICO a win, ruling that insurers filing regulatory complaints about towing charges are shielded by absolute immunity.
The Connecticut Appellate Court, in a decision officially released on March 24, 2026, affirmed the dismissal of claims brought by four towing and auto repair businesses against GEICO and two of its employees, finding that complaints the insurer filed with the state Department of Motor Vehicles over nonconsensual towing and storage fees are protected under the litigation privilege.
The case centered on a long-running dispute between GEICO and a group of Connecticut towing and auto repair businesses – Modzelewski's Towing & Storage, Inc., Chris' Auto Clinic, LLC, MyHoopty.com, LLC, and Farmington Auto Park, LLC. The businesses accused GEICO and employees John P. Vaz, an insurance investigator, and Patrick Capri, who managed insurance claims and oversaw payment of property damage bills, of filing hundreds of baseless complaints with the DMV between 2017 and 2021, alleging overcharging and improper fees for nonconsensual towing, transporting, and storage services.
The businesses claimed this amounted to tortious interference with their customer relationships, defamation through both libel and slander, and promissory estoppel. They alleged that the insurer not only lodged complaints directly with the DMV but also contacted other jurisdictions, police departments, and governmental entities to paint them as bad actors. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that Vaz and Capri personally encouraged customers to file complaints with the DMV and pressured them into making statements contradicting documents they had previously signed.
On the promissory estoppel front, the businesses alleged that GEICO had agreed to pay towing and storage charges, and that they released vehicles based on those promises. GEICO paid up, they said, but then turned around and sought refunds through its DMV complaints.
GEICO and the individual defendants moved to dismiss the case in February 2024, arguing that the DMV's complaint and hearing process for nonconsensual towing disputes qualifies as a quasi-judicial proceeding, and that statements made in connection with that process are absolutely privileged. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case in August 2024.
On appeal, the businesses did not challenge the finding that the DMV hearing process is quasi-judicial. Instead, they focused their argument on public policy, contending that the trial court confused the need for industry regulation with the kind of power imbalance that typically justifies granting absolute immunity. They argued that the court wrongly equated the relationship between towing companies and vehicle owners with the relationship between police and citizens – a context where courts have recognized a stark imbalance of power. They also took issue with the idea that a large national insurer should be free to pepper a state agency with complaints against local towing companies without any legal accountability.
The Appellate Court was not persuaded. In a unanimous decision by Chief Judge Cradle, joined by Judges Suarez and DiPentima, the court held that the trial court properly weighed the public interests behind the legislature's creation of the nonconsensual towing regulatory framework. The regulations exist to protect vehicle owners from exorbitant fees charged by towing operators who hold all the leverage in nonconsensual tow situations. Making it risky to file complaints with the DMV – by exposing complainants to defamation or interference lawsuits – would undermine the entire regulatory scheme.
The court also drew a clear line between this case and situations where courts have limited immunity to a qualified, rather than absolute, standard. In the 2007 case Gallo v. Barile, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that informal statements made to police during a criminal investigation are protected only by qualified immunity. The Appellate Court found that distinction inapplicable here. Unlike informal tips to police, DMV complaints under §14-63-45b are formal filings that initiate a structured administrative process – complete with investigations, hearings, procedural safeguards, and the possibility of license revocation. That makes them more like the formal complaints that courts have consistently held are absolutely privileged.
The court acknowledged that defending against a barrage of allegedly false complaints is a real burden for the businesses. It also noted, however, that the public interest in keeping the complaint process open and accessible outweighs the risk of occasional misuse. The court pointed out that its ruling applies equally whether the complainant is a national insurer or an individual consumer, and that the policy analysis must account for both.
The businesses raised one additional argument – that the litigation privilege should not apply because DMV proceedings could result in criminal sanctions. The court dismissed that contention, noting that absolute immunity has long been recognized even in criminal proceedings where sanctions are possible.
A separate claim that the trial court erred in dismissing allegations about conduct outside the DMV complaint process – specifically, that Vaz and Capri encouraged customers to file false or exaggerated complaints – was not reviewed by the Appellate Court because the plaintiffs failed to adequately brief the argument.
